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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) generally have
a many-to-one structure so that event information flows from
sensors to a unique sink. In recent WSN applications, many-to-
many structures are evolved due to need for conveying collected
event information to multiple sinks at the same time. This
study proposes an anonymity method bases on k-anonymity for
preventing record disclosure of collected event information in
WSNs. Proposed method takes the anonymity requirements of
multiple sinks into consideration by providing different levels of
privacy for each destination sink. Attributes, which may identify
of an event owner, are generalized or encrypted in order to
meet the different anonymity requirements of sinks. Privacy
guaranteed event information can be multicasted to all sinks
instead of sending to each sink one by one. Since minimization
of energy consumption is an important design criteria for WSNs,
our method enables us to multicast the same event information
to multiple sinks and reduce energy consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advances lead to produce low cost
wireless sensors for observing many physical phenomenons
of world like temperature, humidity etc. As wireless sensor
technology takes progress, missions of WSNs get complicated
so that they are used in human, enemy, habitat, structure or
traffic monitoring applications. With the advent of wireless
body are networks, applications for health monitoring of
patients outside the hospitals or home-caring of elderly people
have designed and implemented widely.
Recent WSNs have began to collect much more information
than simple WSNs observing temperature or humidity value of
an environment. In an addition to spatio-temporal information
of an event, especially in object monitoring applications,
other attributes of monitored objects are gathered by sensors.
For example, traffic monitoring applications collect velocity,
direction and size information of a vehicle.
As the complexity of wireless sensor applications increase,
structure of WSNs have evolved in order to meet the new
application requirements. WSNs generally have many-to-one
structure so that sensors collect event information from the
area and send to a unique sink. Some recent sensor applica-
tions have begun to use many-to-many structure which actually
means there exist multiple sinks in the deployed environment.
WSN application may need to send the same event information
to different sinks rather than a unique sink. For example, in a
home-caring application for elderly people, information about
the elderly person can be sent to a family member and a nurse
at the same time.
As capability of WSNs are enhanced, privacy preserving
is getting one of the major problems in these networks.
Huge amount of information about an individual is collected
and distributed. On the other side, individuals generally need
to restrict the details of personal information. Therefore,
countermeasures for privacy threats have to cover the both
needs, enabling data collection and restricting the storage of
some private parts. On the other side, in most of the WSNs,
minimization of energy consumption is one of the primary
criteria due to limited battery capacity or unavailability of
battery replacements. All other security countermeasures as
well as the privacy preserving solutions have to perform their
works with minimum energy.
In this study, energy efficient privacy preserving method is
proposed for WSNs having multiple sinks. Privacy require-
ment level of each sink is assumed to be different from each
other which can be a realistic scenario in recent WSN applica-
tions. Our proposed method meets all the privacy requirements
by consuming low amount of energy.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, motivation
of the study and some background information are given. This
section also includes the description of threat/network model
and statement of our contributions. Section III discusses the
details of proposed method. Section IV shows the experimental
results of simulations. Literature review of the topic is pre-
sented in Section V. Section VI concludes the study.
II. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to decide
which information about themselves would seclude or which
information would revealed to whom. Therefore, a privacy
framework have to use methods which can be easily adapted
to different requirements of applications and users.
Widely usage of WSNs in monitoring applications make
people’s life easy but they may cause violation of privacy.
Untrusted parties can access to the collected information by
eavesdropping, physical capturing of sensors or unauthenti-
cated remote accessing to sensors or central databases [1].
Data encryption and authentication mechanisms can prevent
these types of threats. Although applications of these mecha-
nisms are not straightforward in WSNs, due to limitations like
physical capturing possibility of cryptographic credentials or
limited battery usage, many studies proposed various methods
in order to solve these security problems under the specified
limitations [2], [3].
Restricting the details of information gathered by WSN
is another effective mechanism for preserving of privacy.
These restrictions may be required for prevention of privacy
violations done by un-trusted parties since any privacy risk
caused by a potential data loss incident can be reduced with
the help of these restrictions. However, privacy requirements
of individuals also force the designers of WSNs carry out
some restrictions for data shared with trusted parties. These
trusted parties are actually sinks in WSNs. There are mainly
two reasons for these types of requirements: First one is
trusted party can be captured physically or logically by un-
trusted parties. Especially in applications, where attackers have
high motivation or where major vulnerabilities exist including
lack of physical security, data shared with trusted parties
have to obey some privacy criteria. Enemy tracking, health
monitoring, or wild-life monitoring applications are examples
for these types of applications. The second reason is that
individuals generally want to hide detail information of their
personal lives directly from the trusted party. For example,
in applications where health monitoring is done outside the
hospital, individuals do not want their exact location and time
information to sent hospital particularly in non-urgent times.
However, they may want to weaken their privacy requirements
in urgent times for getting appropriate medical helps. If there
are many sinks in WSN, requirements of individuals may
change for each sink as well. Revisiting health monitoring
applications, information about individuals may be sent to the
family members as well as to hospital. In these applications,
individuals may willing to share more detail information with
their family members but not detailed one with hospital.
Many studies about data privacy has been done in the
database field under the name of “privacy preserving data
publishing” [4]. The main aim is to provide privacy of data
tables which are exchanged by other parties. A generic exam-
ple is the application where hospitals share medical records
with medical research institutions. At first glance, it may be
assumed that privacy problem can be easily solved by stripping
off the attributes which identifies individuals like name, social
security number etc. However, it is shown that it is possible
to identify the owner of a record by using the residual data
and other public information sources. This attack is called
“re-identification attack” [5]. Re-identification attack bases on
the assertion that some attributes, called quasi-identifiers, can
easily help to identify the individuals although they do not
uniquely identify them. Anonymity, which is defined as being
not identifiable of an individual within set of individuals [6],
is used as a privacy criterion in order to make data resistant
to “re-identification attacks”. “k-anonymity” brings a specific
restriction to anonymity so that an individual is hided among
at least k other individuals [5]. Quasi-identifier attributes are
generalized or suppressed in order to meet the requirements
of anonymity. In a generalization operation, attribute is re-
Fig. 1. Network Model
placed by a more general one like replacement of birth data
“04.05.1977” by 1977. One attribute or all attributes of a
record are deleted in a suppression operation. These operations
cause information loss so anonymity solutions intrinsically try
to solve a trade-off between information loss and privacy. They
try to cause minimum information loss while achieving the
required level of privacy.
A. Threat and Network Model
Our threat model bases on the requirement that the indi-
viduals do not want sinks to identify their records among
other records of k individuals within a specified time-frame
through the quasi-identifier fields of records. For simplicity,
it is assumed that one event record is generated for each
individual within that time-frame. The required privacy levels
of each sink differs so that suppose that there are n sinks,
each ith sink has a privacy level pi where each level requires
to share ki-anonymous data with ith sink and inequality of
k1 < k2... < kn is valid.
Sensors are clustered in separate sensor groups according to
sensor localizations where each group has a group head sensor.
In our method, each sensor conveys its readings to group
heads, they k-anonymizes data and multi-cast the anonymized
output to all sinks. Network model is shown in Figure1.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, k-anonymity notion is adapted as a pri-
vacy framework for WSN applications having multiple sinks.
Collected event information is iteratively k-anonymized for
all sinks each having different privacy levels. Encryption
operation with appropriate key management schema is used
in addition to generalization in order to meet the different re-
quirements in one k-anonymized output. Achieving all privacy
requirements in one output considerably decreases the energy
consumption so that this output can be multi-casted to multiple
sinks instead of sending different outputs for each sink. It is
shown that proposed method can make WSN save energy up to
48% while preserving the required privacy levels. Bottom-up
clustering idea is used during k-anonymization process.
III. PROPOSED ANONYMIZATION METHOD
Proposed k-anonymization method, iterative k-
Anonymization (IKA), basically produces a common
k-anonymous data that meets each requirements of sinks by
the help of encryption operation in addition to generalization
operation. The main aim is to meet the privacy requirements
with the minimum information loss. IKA bases on hierarchical
bottom-up clustering idea. Quasi-identifier attributes of records
are extracted from event data and they are feed as input
vectors to iterative hierarchical clustering process. Basic
idea is partitioning the input vectors into clusters where
each cluster has at least k vectors. During the clustering,
each cluster generates a representative vector which contains
common generalized values or encrypted versions of attributes
of all vectors belonging to that cluster. Vectors of clusters
are all replaced with this representative vector in the
anonymous output. Since an appropriate distance function is
used during clustering and appropriate generalizations, this
replacement is expected to create minimum information loss.
k-anonymization work takes place in group head sensors.
Subsection III-A explains how collected information is rep-
resented in our proposed method. In Subsection III-B, distance
metric which is used in the clustering process is described.
Subsection III-C briefs how a common output is formed for
meeting the needs of each sink. Subsection III-D gives the
details of bottom-up clustering process which is the core of
the proposed method.
A. Data Representation
Suppose input data is a table T having m attributes, r
records. Tij , represents the j’th attribute of the i’th record
where, {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ r} and {j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} . Table T is
represented by a set of bit strings B, where Bij is bit string
representation of j’th attribute of i’th record. k’th bit of Bij
is shown as Bij(k). Suppose that j’th attribute of table is
categorical and there are dj distinct values. These values are
indexed by k and shown as Vj(k)where {k : 1 ≤ k ≤ dj}. Bit
string of this categorical attribute has a size of dj and formed
as follows:
If Tij = Vj(k) then Bij(k) = 1 else Bij(k) = 0 as ∀k :
0 ≤ k ≤ dj ,
If attribute is numerical, the range of attribute is divided into
equal-sized intervals. Assume that j’th attribute is numeric
and attribute range is divided into dj number of intervals.
Each interval is indexed by k. Bit string representation of this
numeric attribute has a size of dj and formed as follows:
If Tij intersects with k
′th interval, then Bij(k) =
1 else Bij(k) = 0 as ∀k : 0 ≤ k ≤ dj
B. Information Loss Metric
Calculating the data loss of k-anonymous data is needed to
predict the performance of our proposed method under differ-
ent k-anonymity parameters. In our study, we use the entropy
TABLE I
A SAMPLE BIT STRING REPRESENTATION SET
Records Bi1 Bi2 Bi3
T1 00010 01000 10000
T2 01100 11100 01111
TABLE II
A SAMPLE NORMALIZED VERSION OF BIT STRING REPRESENTATION SET
Records Bi1 Bi2 Bi3




















concept of information theory to measure the information loss
[26]. The difference of entropies between the k-anonymous
data and the original data constitutes the information loss.
Suppose that T is the input data set having r records and
m attributes, B is the bit string representation of this data
set and C is the random variable that gets the probability
value of an attribute value in a k-anonymous data entry being
the actual attribute value in the original data. Assume that all
the entries of B is normalized according to the number of
bits having value “1” in that entry (from now on we refer
“true bit” to a bit having value “1”) and normalized version
forms data set B. A sample data set is shown in Table I.
Here, there are two records; each record has three attributes;
each attribute is categorical and each has five distinct attribute
values. Table II shows the normalized version of data. During
normalization, each entry is divided by the number of true bits
in the corresponding bit string entry.
Information loss of a data table T , IL(T ), is equal to the
conditional entropy, H(C | B). Here, conditional entropy
gives the uncertainty about the prediction of the original
attribute values of a record when we have the knowledge of
corresponding k-anonymous bit strings of that record. Original
data has only one true bit in each bit string because each orig-
inal data entry corresponds to one attribute value. However,
in k-anonymous data, each entry may have more than one
attribute value and each attribute value is represented by an
additional bit. Therefore, if an entry has only one true bit, that
entry does not have information loss. In this situation, we have
no doubt that this true bit is the true bit that comes from the
original data. As the number of true bits increases, disorder
of the data increases because it is harder to predict which one
of them is the original true bit. Prediction gets harder because
information is lost due to the increase in the number of true
bits. Conditional entropy, which is used in order to calculate
the disorder of the data, is a well measurement tool for the
information loss. Conditional entropy H(C | B), which is
equal to information loss of table T , IL(T ), can be found as
follows:
IL(T ) = H(C | B) =∑Bij∈B p(Bij)H(C | B = Bij)






p(C = k | Bij) log p(C = k | Bij)
(1)
In Equation 1, it is assumed that each attribute is con-
verted to bit strings having size z. This means all categorical
attributes have z distinct attribute values and all numerical
attributes have z number of interval ranges. Also, it is assumed
that all k’s, where the equalities of p(C = k | Bij) = 0 are
true, are excluded from the summation. C random variable
can take values from the set {1..z}. Actually, B is calculated
for finding the value of this random variable.
p(C = k | B = Bij) = Bij(k) for each k : 1 ≤ k ≤ z (2)
In Equation 1, it is assumed that each record has equal
probability to be chosen and each attribute of record has the
same probability, therefore probability mass function of j’th
attribute of i’th record, p(Bij), is calculated as p(Bij) = 1m.r .
Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:








Suppose that F is the array that contains the number of true
bits of the bit string array B. Total number of true bits in Bij
is Fij . Total number of elements in Bij(k) that has the value
of 1Fij is equal to Fij , and the rest is zero. Therefore, the
second sum operation of Equation 3 yields the value, log 1Fij .
The simplest equation for the information loss of data table
T , IL(T ), can be calculated as follows:














C. Iterative Anonymization Model
In the WSN, there are n sinks and n − 1 symmetric
encryption keys which are labelled as e1, e2..en−1. i′th sink
contains list of the keys as ei, ei..en−1. Each group head
sensors store all the n − 1 keys. In IKA, anonymization is
completed in n iterative steps as shown Figure 2. In the first
step, by using only generalization operation, input data is k1-
anonymized. In the second step, k1−anonymous data is k2-
anonymized by encrypting the chosen data parts by e1. For
each ith step to nth step, anonymization is done by encryption
using key, ei−1 . The output after nth iteration is multi-casted
to all sinks.
After the arrival of anonymous data, each sink decrypts the
data with their keys. The result data after decryption actually
has the level of privacy required for that sink. ith sink can only
recover the encrypted operations done after the ith iterations
because it has the corresponding keys. Data parts encrypted
by the keys, e1..ei−2, are not decrypted therefore they can be
considered as suppression operations for that sink. 1st sink,
which has to get data with lowest privacy criteria, can decrypt
all the encrypted parts and the result data is actually k1-
anonymized. In the other side, nth sink has no any key and
gathers data as kn-anonymized.
Fig. 2. Steps of Iterative Anonymization
D. Bottom-Up Hierarchical Clustering Process
Method bases on forming clusters of input vectors itera-
tively. Each cluster numerated as Clj in each epoch, l, contains
a number of input vectors, N lj , and a representative vector,
Rlj where j is index number of cluster. Suppose that kth data
item of representative vector is denoted as Rlj [k]. Represen-
tative vector is actually anonymized output of input vectors
belonging to that cluster which is formed by generalization
and encryption operations of some data parts of vectors.
Hierarchical clustering process starts with the assumption
that each input vector constitutes separate cluster and that
vector is also representative vector of the cluster. In each
epoch, by using the information loss metric described in
Section III-B, distances between each cluster are calculated.
Distance between any two clusters is actually equal to the
information loss that may occur if both clusters are merged.
Two clusters having smallest distance, assume that clusters,
Cls and Clt , are chosen for merging. New bigger cluster, Cl+1u
which contains the vector items of both clusters is formed
and old two clusters are deleted. N l+1u is equal to the sum
of N ls and N lt . If the anonymity operation is generalization,
Rl+1u [k], is equal to the XOR of Rls[k] and Rlt[k]. If operation
is encryption, representative vector, Rl+1u [k], is calculated as
follows (Encryption function, E, input to function, x, encrypted
output, E(x), concatenation operation, ‖):
If Rls[k] = Rlt[k] then Rl+1u [k] = E(Rls[k]||Rlt[k])
otherwise Rl+1u [k] = Rls[k]
In Figure 3, a sample merging operation is shown. Two
clusters having representative vectors, (0011, 1010, 1000) and
(0011, 1100, 1000) are merged. If anonymization opera-
tion is chosen as generalization, by using of XOR oper-
ation, representative vector of new cluster is computed as
(0011, 1110, 1000). In the case of encryption operation, first
and third items remains as the same value in the new rep-
resentative vector because they are identical in both clusters.
Fig. 3. Merge Operation of Clusters
Second item is encryption of 1010||1100.
Clustering process occurs in each iteration of anonymiza-
tion model described in Section III-C. In that model, each
iteration takes ki-anonymized output, clustering operations
are completed until data is ki+1-anonymized. In the first
iteration, , where raw data is k1-anonymized by generalization
operations. In the second one and the rest of all iterations data
is anonymized to a higher level by encryption operations where
different key is used in each iteration.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Main aim of k-Anonymity solutions is providing the re-
quired privacy level with minimum information loss. However
another factor, minimization of energy consumption, is an
important criteria in WSNs. A sensor node consumes energy
for different processes like event sensing, CPU processing, or
transmitting/receiving data packets. Among these processes,
transmission/reception operations consumes much of the en-
ergy so that studies [27] show that energy consumption rates
for transmission/reception is over three orders of magnitude
greater than the energy consumption rates for encryption.
Since each sensor node acts as a router for the messages of
other nodes and one message goes over many hops in the
network, energy saving for transmission/reception operations
becomes a crucial design criterion. Shortening the length of
messages and decreasing the number of travelled hops would
help to reduce energy enormously.
In a WSN topology where there are multiple sinks and
each sink has different privacy criteria, the basic solution
of anonymization is that group head sensor anonymizes the
data, produces different outputs for each sink and sends each
output to related sink in different paths as shown in Figure
4 (In this figure, there are two sinks in WSN). However,
IKA produces unique output which is ready for multicasting.
One anonymized output is sent to a multicast point. After
reaching to multicast point, one copy of data is sent to sink1
and the other copy is sent to sink2 as presented in Figure
5. Multicasting schema decreases the number of travelled
hops. Assume that the number of hops in the shortest
route from group head sensor, G, to Sink1 and Sink2 is
represented as hG,Sink1, hG,Sink2 respectively. Also assume
that the hop distance between G and multicast point, M, is
hG,M , distances from M to Sink1 and Sink2 are hM,Sink1,
hM,Sink2. Our method finds the appropriate node for M
so that hG,M + hM,Sink1 + hM,Sink2 is minimum and the
following inequality holds:
hG,Sink1 + hG,Sink2 > hG,M + hM,Sink1 + hM,Sink2
In order to prove the decrease of number of hops that
messages travel, expected number of message relaying is
calculated as below. Suppose the WSN field has the size
of Xregion.Yregion and WSN has two sinks having different
privacy criteria. Group head nodes are uniformly deployed in
this area. Sink1 is located at Xsink1, 0 and sink2 is located at
(Xsink2, 0). The group head nodes are uniformly distributed.
Expected distance value of a group head node to sink1, dsink1,







(x −Xsink1)2 + (y − 0)2f(x)f(y)dxdy
(5)
Here, f(x) and f(y) are the probability distribution func-
tions of group head node coordinates. Since they are uni-
formly distributed, they are chosen as f(x) = 1/Xregion and
f(y) = 1/Yregion. The expected number of hops an event
message travels from a group head node to sink1 is:
hsink1 = dsink1/R (6)
where R is the distance of each hop. From group head
node to sink1, an event message travels hsink1 hops which







(x −Xsink1)2 + (y − 0)2
XregionYregionR
dxdy (7)
hsink2, the number of hops for reaching sink2 can be
calculated with nearly the same formula with the exception
that sink2 is located at the coordinate value, (Xsink2, 0).
Let’s assume that the size of WSN field is 500m x 500m,
distance of each hop, R, is 10m, location of sink1 is at (100, 0)
and location of sink2 is at (400, 0). Expected number of hops
for reaching to each sink from group head nodes is computed
as 32.86 by using Equation 7. Since different anonymized
output is sent to each sink in the first option, total number of
hops is 65.72. Minimization of length of multicast route can
be achieved when multicast point has an expected distance
of 28.2 hops from group head node. Total length amount
of multicast route is 30.07. This is considerably lower than
the previous alternative. We assume that each group head
node covers a region having 50m x 50m and each sensor is
uniformly distributed through the region. The expected number
Fig. 4. Routes when multiple k-anonymized outputs are generated
Fig. 5. Routes when IKA anonymized output is multicasted to sinks
of hops from sensor node to group head node is calculated
and they are taken into consideration in calculation of energy
consumption. Energy consumption is not only depend on the
number of hops, length of the messages are also important for
the final results. Message lengths are taken into consideration
during energy calculations.
Energy consumption parameters are determined according
to the experimental results presented in [27]. We assume that
the data is processed in Sensoria’s WINS NG RF subsystem
with MIPS R400 processor where encryption algorithm is
AES. The transmission/reception, transmission/encryption and
encryption/decryption energy consumption ratios for the same
length of data are shown in Table 10. The transmission and
reception rate is taken as 10 Kbps and power is 10mW. In all
energy calculations, only event data processes are taken into
consideration. We assume that transmission energy of each
byte TT is 1.5 units (the actual unit is not so important since
we eventually calculate energy saving as a ratio), reception
energy TR is 1 unit, encryption and decryption energy, TE
and TD, are 4.29e-4 units.
Assume that energy consumption of method named as
“multipath method” where each anonymized output is sent
to each sink separately is denoted as Emultipath and energy
consumption of multicast method is represented as Emulticast.
TABLE III
ENERGY CONSUMPTION RATIOS





RESULTS OF MULTIPATH METHOD WITH DATA SETS HAVING VARIOUS
RECORD NUMBERS





Energy gain ratio of IKA, EGIKA, is computed as follows:
EGAIKA = 1− Emulticast
Emultipath
(8)
Table IV and Table V give the results of anonymization
process according to multipath and multicast methods respec-
tively. Information loss results for sink1 are the same in both
methods. Multipath directly sends k1-anonymized output to
sink1. On the other side, IKA generates an output which is
generalized to reach anonymity level k1 and k1−anonymized
output is converted to k2-anonymous data by encryption
operations. Sink1 decrypts the encrypted parts and gets the
k1-anonymized data which is exactly the same data received
by sink1 in multipath method. However, information loss of
multipath method for sink2 is greater than loss of multicast
method in each experiment. Encrypted parts show suppression
behavior for sink2 due to lack of decryption key in sink2.
Suppression causes more information loss than generalization
operation so that IKA suppresses all the columns of vectors
belonging to one cluster and multipath method uses only gen-
eralization operation for sink2. However, encryption enables
us to multicast the data which results with high amount of
energy savings as shown in Figure 6. Energy gain increases up
to 48% when the record number is 1000. Energy gain increases
as the number of records gets bigger so that this result shows
the effectiveness of IKA in data sets having high number of
records.
V. RELATED WORK
Studies on privacy problem mostly concentrated on achiev-
ing sharing of databases under the required privacy constraints
in order to make efficient knowledge-based decisions. Generic
name, “Privacy Preserving Data Publishing”, is given to these
TABLE V
RESULTS OF MULTICAST METHOD WITH DATA SETS HAVING VARIOUS
RECORD NUMBERS





Fig. 6. Energy Gain vs Record Numbers by Multicast Method
efforts [4]. k-anonymity notion is introduced by Samarati and
Sweeney in [5]. It is shown that k-anonymization with mini-
mum number of suppression is NP-hard [11]. Some optimal k-
anonymization algorithms have been presented which may be
feasible for small sized data sets [12], [13]. Greedy heuristics
algorithms are proposed to find approximate solutions for large
data sets [14], [15].
All these k-anonymity solutions solve the prevention of
“record linkage attack” which is actually finding the owner of a
record through quasi-identifier attributes. However, it is shown
that without finding the exact owner of a record, if sensitive
attribute exists in a record, it may be possible to identify
sensitive attribute of an individual in some circumstances by
an attack called “attribute linkage attack” [4]. This problem is
also named as “attribute disclosure” [16]. In order to prevent
attribute linkage and record linkage together, k-anonymity
notion extended in some studies. Machanavajjhala et. al.
extended k-anonymity with a l-diversity notion that also pre-
vents the identity disclosure when attackers have background
knowledge [16]. Notion of p-sensitive is introduced so that
p of k-anonymized records having identical quasi-identifier
attribute values have to have distinct sensitive attribute values
[17]. Generalization hierarchies are constructed for sensitive
attributes and extended version of p-sensitive notion is adapted
in [18]. An additional requirement, t-closeness, for l-diversity
is defined in [19]. In this study, distribution of sensitive
attributes in a record set having identical quasi-identifier
attribute values are adjusted so that it is close to the distribution
of that attribute in overall data set.
Anonymity is considered as hiding the identities of sender
or receiver of a communication in data and communication
networks for many years. DC-Net and mix-net solutions are
proposed for achieving sender or receiver anonymity [8], [7].
Especially, mix-net idea have been used in many practical
Internet applications like web and e-mail [9], [10]. In ad-hoc
networks, routing protocols for anonymous transmission of the
data packets are designed.
Studies about the anonymity problem in WSNs basically try
to hide location or time information of the events. Gruteser
et al. [20], [21] proposed anonymity solutions for providing
high degree of privacy in a sensor network that gives location-
based services. Ozturk et al. [22] proposed phantom routing
method for hiding location information of originator sensor
node in a sensor network. Threat model is based on an
existence of only one movable adversary node in the envi-
ronment. Location privacy protection of receiver in a WSN
is provided by a routing protocol in [23]. Proposed routing
protocol prevents the eavesdropper to identify the receiver by
tracing the wireless packets. It randomizes the routing paths
and injects fake packets in order to mislead eavesdroppers.
Wadaa et al. [24]studied on providing anonymity of coordinate
system, cluster and routing structures during the network setup
of a WSN. Protection of location privacy is guaranteed by k-
anonymity in location based services those are given on mobile
networks [25]. None of these studies do not propose solution
for anonymity problem in WSNs having multiple sinks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a k-anonymization model for WSNs having
multiple sinks are proposed. Study bases on a realistic threat
model which states that each sink has different level of privacy
requirements. Proposed method reduces energy consumption
while fulfilling the required different privacy levels. Method
uses encryption operations with generalization operations in
order to have one common anonymized output. Multicasting
of this output enables WSN to reduce a great amount of
energy so that in some experiments energy reduction can
increase to 48%. Multicasting method can degrade the data
quality of some sinks. Owner of WSNs has to decide about
the trade-off between energy saving and information loss.
The intelligence of choosing data parts for encryption can be
enhanced for decreasing the information loss caused by the
proposed method as a future work.
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